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Abstract: Demonetization is a dominant feature of transition in Russia and Ukraine. This paper 
studies a mechanism of decentralized trade and examines possibility of the development of in-kind 
trade as a consequence of difficulty to trade at the anonymous monetary market. In-kind trade 
allows to a group of agents, inefficient in production, to overcome the difficulty of direct barter 
providing them with an instrument which substitutes money. 
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1. Introduction 
Demonetization has become a distinctive feature of transition in Russia and Ukraine. This is a 
complex phenomenon but commonly it is identified with proliferation of barter. Different estimates 
show that demonetization in Russia and Ukraine reached unprecedented in economic history levels, 
the share of non-cash payments in 1998 was 60 percent of total sales in Russia and 50 percent in 
Ukraine.  
The process of demonetization was puzzling. The number of non-cash transactions started to 
increase in both countries starting from 1994, when inflation was under control, and continued in 
the following four years in spite of relative macroeconomic stability. Non monetary transactions 
started to decrease right after the financial crisis in the August of 1998 when both countries had to 
devaluate strongly their currencies. These stylized facts do not allow us to explain demonetization 
as a flight from money which commonly occurs in the periods of hyperinflation. In fact there were 
many Latin American countries which experienced long and repeated periods of hyperinflation, but 
they did not see demonetization analogous to Russia and Ukraine. 
The most well-known and influential explanation of this phenomenon is virtual economy due to 
Gaddy and Ickes (1998). According to it, the root of the problem was the desire of countries to 
appear more productive than they really were. The practice of over-reporting of economic results 
was already very diffuse in the last years of the Soviet Union and it continued in the first decade of 
transition. Influential groups in economy - government and industrial lobbies - pretended that old 
manufacturing sector was producing a valuable output while it was not. Keeping in life value-
subtracting productions required pulling resources from the value-adding sectors. It was done by 
means of barter or non-cash transactions which allowed to the inefficient sector to sell its output to 
the value-adding sector at a higher price. 
Barter, seen from this prospect, is definitely a "bad" thing. Old manufacturing sector is not a victim 
of transition but is its active player. It invests in good relations with authorities (rent-seeking) rather 
than in restructuring. Virtual economy, however, is subject to critics. One of them is that it does not 
explain clearly how it is possible that a value-adding sector decides to subsidize an inefficient 
sector. Furthermore, it does not take in consideration that restructuring option was not realistic for 
many enterprises anyway. They invested in creation of non-cash chains but it was the only way to 
survive. Being some production always better than no production at all, barter then is not only a 
"bad" thing. 
Among other explanations of demonetization there is a lack of liquidity and credit. According to it, 
the growth of nonmonetary transactions can be explained examining closely the measures which 
were used for stabilization scope in that countries: sharp tightening of monetary policy and fiscal 
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correction. In Russia monetary and fiscal policies were apparently tightened. In the period from 
1995 to 1998 the primary deficit was decreasing but consolidated deficit - increasingly composed of 
interest payments - remained constantly at the level of 6 - 8 per cent of GDP. In the same period the 
stock of outstanding government treasury bills increased from 4 to 17 per cent of GDP. The 
recourse of government to the treasury bills seems to be a key factor for the explanation of 
demonetization. 
Firms were facing strong credit squeeze consequence of stabilization programs. They resorted to the 
increased use of trade credit, but being credit squeeze general, in a short time growth in trade credit 
resulted in accumulation of arrears. Initially, the firms were possessing more or less the same 
quantities of overdue payables and receivables which confirms the hypothesis of credit chains. With 
time the composition of overdue payables and receivables changed, there was seen an increase in 
the share of overdue payables that firms had versus budget. All this suggests that government was 
redistributing credit, taking it from banks and giving it to the real sector under the form of toleration 
of overdue payables. This mechanism was commonly used till the financial crisis in 1998. 
In this paper I construct a stylized model of decentralized trade in which agents trade bilaterally and 
randomly. They run risk of non-trade and of going out of existence. It reproduces the liberalization 
of trade and prices at the beginning of transition. It is assumed that at the beginning of time one part 
of economic agents is not efficient in production. In-kind trade begins because inefficient agents 
find it difficult to trade at monetary market. Once a part of economic agents drop monetary trade, 
the quantity of money decreases. Economy is demonetized. 
The first part of the model is a description of a decentralized trade process, of trade strategies of 
single agents and of equilibrium condition. In the second part of the model it is assumed that the 
part of agents are not production efficient. They are not able to produce enough for quid pro qua 
trade, and in certain conditions efficient agents reject to trade with them. Inefficient agents, being 
unable to trade at the anonymous monetary market, invest in creation of in-kind mechanism of 
trade.  
  
2. A Stylized Model 
The economy is populated by a large number of agents which can live infinitely if they manage to 
consume at least once during a period. The total population is normalized to one. Time is discrete. 
Each period is subdivided in two sub periods with two independent trades: morning and evening. 
The economy is modelled from t=1, considered the beginning of transition. At this moment 
population is composed of agents that lived in the pre-transition time and those who begin their 
existence at t=1. The main difference between pre-transition and transition is that in the previous 
time trade was centrally coordinated, in-kind exchange in which money was not necessary and 
every agent was guaranteed an exchange. With the beginning of transition central coordinator is 
removed and agents must trade bilaterally according to a pair wise random matching process. 
Agents must trade in order to consume, produce and survive. There are many consumption goods 
traded in this economy, but any given agent can consume only a fraction x of it, with 0<x≤1. This 
parameter captures the extent to which preferences of agents are differentiated. x equals the 
proportion of goods that can be consumed by any given agent, and x also equals the proportion of 
agents that can consume any given good. If a good can be consumed by the agent, then this is his 
consumption good and by consuming q of it he enjoys u(q) utility, while consuming q of non 
consumption good he gets utility 0. The smaller is x, the less substitutable are the commodities, the 
more specialized is economy. It is assumed that agents cannot consume their own output, thus there 
are always benefits to trade over autarky. 
Consumption is the only input for production. For the moment we study the case in which all agents 
have the same technology which is by consuming q of own consumption good, each of them 
produces y=q of own production good. In the second part of the model we consider the case in 
which some agents - a group which lived in the pre-transition time - are endowed with different 
technology. 
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At t=1 all population is divided in two fractions. Fraction μ is composed of agents endowed with 
one unit of money - buyers. Fraction 1-μ is composed of agents endowed with one unit of own 
output - sellers. Trade frictions in this economy are such that agents, when buyers, arrive to trade 
with intensity β₂ of Poisson process, and when sellers they arrive with intensity β₁  of Poisson 
process, 1β < 2β ≤1. 
It is convenient to study a case in which each trade is one-to-one swap. The probability that a buyer 
meets during a sub period one right seller during equals 1(1 ) xμ β− . The probability that a seller 
meets one right buyer during a sub period 2xμβ . At any moment of time agent can be either sellers 
or buyers. 
 
2.1. Trading Strategies 
Since nobody can consume what produces in this economy, agents will benefit from trade. Two 
types of trade are possible. The first one is barter in which both traders - sellers - find their 
consumption goods, its probability is x². Since both agents benefit from barter, whenever possible, 
they should barter for a good they want to consume. The second possible trade is good-for-money. 
After this trade only one agent - buyer - can consume, seller receives money which is useless for 
consumption. Thus, while barter is undoubtedly traded, it is to be determined whether good-for-
money trades are processed. 
Let π₀ denote the probability that seller trades goods for money, and let π₁ denote probability that 
buyer trades money for goods. Let assume that money is used as a medium of exchange, or 
circulates, if and only if >0.   Herewith we describe trading strategies of agents and then verify 
whether money-for-good or good-for-money trades are processed in equilibrium. 
Representative buyer starts morning searching his consumption good. If he meets an agent who has 
his consumption good, which occurs with probability 1(1 ) xμ β−  and if both of them want to trade, 
which occurs with probability π in equilibrium, buyer will consume, produce and switch to the 
seller1. Otherwise, morning buyer remains buyer in the evening as well. The value function of 
morning buyer is, 
1 1(1 ) [ ]
m e e e
b s b brV x U V V Vμ β π= − + − +        (1) 
equal to the payoff from trade: utility from consumption plus the value of switching to the evening 
seller1, 1
e
sV ; plus the value of non trading and remaining buyer in the evening, 
e
bV . 
In the morning representative seller searches to meet an agent with whom to barter. If he meets him, 
which occurs with probability 21(1 ) xμ β− , morning seller consumes produces and goes to the 
evening as a seller1. Differently morning seller may meet a buyer who likes his output. It occurs 
with probability 2xμβ . If both agents want to trade, which occurs with probability π, then morning 
seller takes money and switches to the evening buyer. If morning seller does not meet neither of the 
mentioned agents, he goes to the evening as evening seller2. The value function of the 
representative morning seller is, 
2
2 2 1 1 2[ ] (1 ) [ ]
m e e e e
s b s s srV x V V x U V Vμβ π μ β= − + − + −      (2) 
The expected value function of the evening buyer is, 
1(1 ) [ ]
e m
b srV x U Vμ β= − +         (3) 
which is equal to the payoff from trade: utility from consumption plus the value of living to the next 
period as morning seller, msV . The payoff from non trade in the evening is not considered because it 
is equal to zero. If agents that find themselves to be evening buyers, do not trade in the evening, 
they die.     
There are two types of evening sellers. Evening sellers1 are those i) who were sellers in the morning 
and have already bartered; and ii) those who were morning buyers and already traded. Such agents 
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in the evening may barter or sell output for money or may not trade at all. In all of these cases they 
live to the next period. Their expected value function is, 
2
1 1 2(1 ) [ ]
e m m m
s b s srV x U x V V Vμ β μβ π= − + − +       (4) 
Evening sellers2 are those agents who were sellers in the morning and did not trade at that time. 
They have a chance to live to the next period if they barter in the evening, 
2
2 1(1 ) [ ]
e m
s srV x U Vμ β= − +         (5) 
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